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Introduction
During my first year as a graduate student, my wife’s uncle died after a long battle with
brain cancer, and a few months later my father-in-law died in a motorcycle accident. These two
events, while of a different sort than the kind of evil I will be writing about here, sparked my
interest in the relationship between theology, philosophy, and evil. While philosophy of religion
and theology have recently focused on theodicies and defenses dealing with the problem of evil,
which is the dilemma posed by the existence of a good God and the existence of evil in the
world, my hope is to look at evil in a different light. 1 While providing theodicies and defenses
against the problem of evil is important, it is also important to think about evil metaphysically.
To think about evil metaphysically is to attempt to articulate not how evil and God can coexist,
but what evil is. To that end, I will attempt a retrieval of the metaphysical account of evil as
privation of the good and show that it can function as a normative account of evil in the
contemporary era.
To do this, I will first examine the traditional accounts of evil as privation that we owe to
Augustine and Aquinas. Second, I will attempt to show that metaphysical reflection on creation
can allow contemporary people to rediscover the good, or value, inherent in creation, leaning
especially on the work of William Desmond. Third, I will turn explicitly to consider influential
contemporary philosophical work on the nature of evil. Finally, I will show that privation theory
can provide an account of evil that has normative and practical consequences for how Christians
conceptualize evil. Here I show how a metaphysically robust understanding of evil can help
Christians be more effective as we attempt to counteract evil in the contemporary world. In this

There are at least two ways in which the problem of evil is categorized (although there can be more). The first is
the logical problem of evil. The logical problem of evil is presented as: can both a good, omnipotent, and omniscient
God and evil exist? The second is the evidential problem of evil. The evidential problem runs like this: can a good,
omnipotent, and omniscient God exist when horrendous evils exist as well?
1
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last section, I will examine the privation account of evil in conjunction with certain events in the
20th century. One of the major criticisms of privation theory is that it fails to account for some of
the major atrocities of the 20th century. I hope to show that privation theory can not only account
for everyday moral evils, but that it can also account for horrendous evils as well.
Before beginning my argument, I will note a few important aspects of this paper. I will
begin with a short section explaining my methodology. Then, I will briefly distinguish between
two different kinds of evils. Lastly, I will detail some important objections to privation theory.
Method
Metaphysics is the branch of philosophical inquiry that asks and seeks to answer
questions about the nature of reality. The metaphysician is concerned with understanding the
physical and (if such there be) non-physical realities of the world. 2 Since the Pre-Socratic
philosophers, the general aims of metaphysics have often been understood to be the central aims
of philosophical investigation. 3
Aristotle describes metaphysics as “‘first philosophy.’” 4 Yet, in the contemporary world,
metaphysics has largely been pushed to the margins of philosophy. 5 It was accused of being
“‘cognitively meaningless’” by the logical positivists because metaphysical conclusions are not
“empirically verifiable.” 6 However, metaphysics is in some sense an inescapable reality. Even
the claim that all is “spatiotemporal (a part of ‘nature’) and is knowable only through the

2
Panayot Butchvarov, “Metphysics,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Ed, ed. Robert Audi (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 563.
3
D.W. Hamlyn, “metaphysics, history of.,” in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 556.
4
Butchvaraov, “Metphysics,” 564.
5
While metaphysics has made a resurgence in contemporary philosophical investigation, I do not think it holds the
same position that it did before the 20th century. Therefore, I think that it is a fair to say that metaphysics, while it
certainly has regained some prominence in contemporary philosophy, is still marginal in the field as a whole.
6
Ibid., 563.

Shrader-Perry 4
methods of the sciences, is itself a metaphysical claim, namely metaphysical realism.” 7
Ultimately, this paper will engage in a metaphysical reflection on evil. By this I mean, I will
attempt to answer the question: what is evil? To do this, I will begin with a retrieval of the
Augustinian and Thomistic accounts of privation theory.
By retrieval, I mean both a historical examination of privation theory, and an attempt to
revitalize it for the contemporary mind. This means that although I may not hold all of the same
commitments about the nature of God or even the nature of the good as Augustine or Aquinas, I
do hold to the same basic understanding of evil as privation of the good. I also share with
Augustine and Aquinas a conviction that metaphysical thinking about evil has both normative
and practical effects on the way in which Christians attempt to mitigate evil in the world. Here I
should note that my application of privation theory will be different than both Augustine and
Aquinas. However, I believe that even though my application of privation theory differs from the
Augustinian and the Thomist account, I still hold true to the basic tenants of privation theory—
i.e., that evil is a lack of particular goods associated with particular beings, that being is
fundamentally good, and that the goodness of being is structured hierarchically (that is to say,
some beings are more good than others). 8
One of the difficulties with thinking metaphysically is that metaphysics tends to defy
systematic articulation and conceptualization. For some, this would prevent them from
attempting any articulation of metaphysical thought, but for others, like Desmond, the
Ibid.
The hierarchical nature of being should not be understood as contrary to the inherent goodness of being. To say
that some beings are more, or less, good than others is not to suggest that some beings are therefore more, or less,
evil. The hierarchical nature of being is an attempt to describe the differing moral worth of differing beings.
Although contemporary persons do not necessarily admit to holding a hierarchical account of the value of being,
many (however not all) contemporary persons do hold that different beings have varying degrees of moral worth.
Many, I think that it might be fair to say most, people would hold to the belief that human beings are more valuable
than animals. This is an example of a hierarchical understanding of the goodness of being.
7
8

Shrader-Perry 5
recognition that all metaphysical thinking ultimately ends up in failure is simply the beginning of
metaphysics. 9 In other words, the failure of systematic thought to articulate metaphysics should
not discourage the metaphysician. Instead, this failure should be embraced as part of the process
of metaphysical thinking.
Like Desmond, I wish to begin by articulating that metaphysical examinations of evil are
ultimately doomed to failure. However, this should not keep us from attempting to think
metaphysically about evil. It should remind us that a philosophical venture as great as
metaphysics should be accompanied by great humility. It seems as though Augustine also had
difficulty systematizing his thoughts on evil. Charlene Burns describes Augustine’s work on evil
in this way: “A chronological examination of his writings on evil reveals tensions at times
between Augustine the Neoplatonic philosopher, Augustine the hearer of Manichaeism,
Augustine the newly baptized Christian, and Augustine the powerful bishop.” 10 However, the
tensions within his thought might stem from the nature of metaphysics as non-systematic. To
mitigate the non-systematic nature of metaphysics, Desmond attempts metaphysical thinking in a
profound way. He articulates his systematic thoughts in a way that is both whole, but also open
to the other: an open whole. 11 Typically, systematic writings are thought of as closed off and
whole on their own. I hope that my own metaphysical reflection on evil in this paper will be an
open whole.
Here I should also note the limitations of this paper. While much has been written on the
topic of evil in the wider traditions of philosophy and theology, I will be writing from and within

9
William Desmond, Being in the Between (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), xv.; Christopher
Ben Simpson, Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern (Eugene: Wpif & Stock, 2009), 23-24.
10
Charlene Burns, Christian Understandings of Evil: The Historical Trajectory, Christian Understandings, ed. Denis
Janz, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016), 60
11
Desmond, Being in the Between, xiv, 211.
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the tradition of distinctively Western philosophy and theology. I do not intend to disparage
Eastern philosophy or theology, but I find myself firmly rooted in the traditions of the West.
Although a large portion of this paper will engage with the Catholic philosophical and
theological tradition, I myself am a Protestant philosopher and theologian. As a white, male,
philosopher and theologian, I attempt to recognize the limits of my own perspective, and I
attempt to engage with some women philosophers in the largely male dominated tradition of
philosophy and theology. 12
I note my own limitations in an attempt to emphasizes that my thinking on the subject of
evil comes from a particular perspective. Although I believe my thinking can be applied
normatively to most, and potentially to all, instances of evil, I realize I cannot possibly
synthesize all of the relevant thinking about evil in this paper. Therefore, this paper should be
understood as an open whole. It is a whole in the sense that it can stand on its own and can
function as a normative framework through which we can understand and evaluate evil, but it is
open in the sense that it is bound by a particular perspective and therefore must be open to
critique and criticism from other perspectives. I embrace my own perspective, but I realize that
there are other philosophical and theological ways of understanding evil that can invigorate my
argument and there are understandings that would challenge it.
Distinguishing Evils
Philosophy distinguishes between natural and moral evils. Natural evils are events that
happen in the world that occur naturally, such as: earthquakes, tsunamis, wild fires, etc. This
category might also include disease and other events that are not the result of the actions of a

Some women who have been formative in my theological and philosophical thinking are Elizabeth Johnson and
Marylin Adams McCord. However, neither of their works pertain exactly to the topic of this paper.

12
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conscious moral agent. 13 Augustine understood natural evils as the consequences of the Fall. 14
He distinguishes the two kinds of evils by differentiating between evil “that someone has done”
and evil “that someone has suffered.” 15 He continues on to say that the second form of evil,
which will be called natural evil here, is the result of God’s just punishment against the wicked.
Here is one point at which I diverge from Augustine, I do not believe that natural evils are the
result of God’s punishment for wickedness. Ultimately, natural evils are beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead, I will focus on the way in which evil as privation applies to moral evil.
Objections to Privation Theory
In the contemporary world, proponents of privation theory seem to be fighting an uphill
battle. Stanely Kane notes: “Aside from orthodox Thomists, few philosophers, either theists or
their critics accept” privation theory any more. 16 John Milbank explains that many disregard
privation theory because its description of evil seems to lack the explanatory power necessary to
account for “the unprecedented evil of the twentieth century: the mass organization of totalitarian
control and terror, systematic genocide, and the enslavement of people who are deliberately
worked to the point of enfeeblement and then slaughtered.” 17 Critics, of the sort described by
Milbank, claim that privation theory cannot account for the evils of the twentieth century
because it describes evil as a product of “the deliberate pursuit of a lesser good.” 18 This seems
13
Here we might distinguish between the actions of a conscious agent (potentially some kind of animal) and a
conscious moral agent (such as a human being).
14
Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company,
1993), 1.
15
Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, 1. While people suffer from evil “that someone has done,” no one
causes natural evil (although we might note that climate change is caused by human agents, but the effects of
climate change on natural evils might be best understood as indirectly caused by human agents). The distinction for
Augustine between evil “that someone has done” (moral evil) and evil “that someone has suffered” (natural evil)
should be understood in this way: evil “that someone has done” can certainly be suffered, but natural evil is only
suffered and is not caused by any particular moral agent.
16
Statenly Kane, “Evil and Privation,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11. No. 1 (1980): 43.
17
John Milbank, “Darkness and Silence: Evil and the Western Legacy”, Evil in Contemporary Political Theory, eds.
Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts, & Peter Sutch (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 10.
18
Ibid.

Shrader-Perry 8
unsatisfying to many contemporary philosophers. They question: how can an event like the
Holocaust find its genesis in the pursuit of a lesser good? In the end, many contemporary
philosophers conclude that privation theory fails to function as a normative account of evil
because it does not seem able to account for the atrocities of the twentieth century. However, I
intend to show that privation theory can function as a normative account of evil in the
contemporary world.
Chapter 1
Augustine and Aquinas
I begin by examining the Augustinian account of privation theory because it provides the
background for the more systematic account of Aquinas. Augustine’s account has merit on its
own, but I find the Thomistic account to be better suited to provide a normative account of evil
because of its systematic nature. Taking both accounts of privation theory together also provides
contemporary persons with a more holistic account of evil as privation. On their own, both
accounts are able to normatively account for evil. But taken together, these accounts of privation
theory provide a more holistic vision for understanding evil as privation. 19
Saint Augustine (354 - 430 CE) was one of the most influential Christian philosophers in
the Western tradition. He was born into a time when Christianity had become a major power, yet
was still in the formative stages of its systematic development. 20 John Hick says of the great
theologian and philosopher: “Augustine’s influence was exerted at an earlier and more plastic
stage in the growth of the Christian mind and neither scholasticism nor Protestantism has

I think this is especially true because Aquinas attempts to rearticulate much of Augustine’s thoughts on the
privative nature of evil. While Aquinas certainly has different philosophical commitments than Augustine, he comes
to similar conclusions in a more systematic way. I think Aquinas would see his account of privation theory as a
direct expansion of the Augustinian account.
20
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 37.
19
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significantly altered the grand design of his picture of God and the universe, or his conception of
the drama of man’s creation, fall, and redemption.” 21 Although Augustine adapted his
understanding of evil as privation from Plotinus, he was the first, and certainly one of the most
formative, Christian theologians to think metaphysically about evil.
During the early stages of his life, Augustine strongly resisted the Christian faith. Instead,
he was drawn toward Manichaeanism because he believed that it best explained the existence of
evil in the world. 22 The Manichaeans believed that the best explanation for evil and suffering in
the world was the existence of both a good god and an evil god who fought over the fate of
humanity. They believed in a dualistic world in which the spiritual was synonymous with the
good, while the material was understood to be evil. Burns explains: “Manichaean dualism taught
that there are two independent and opposite forces, the good light and evil darkness. These
opposite forces permeate creation...the ascetic lifestyle of the Manichaean elect served to release
the light trapped in the evil material body.” 23 Eventually, Augustine would turn away from
Manichaeanism and convert to Christianity.
After his conversion, he realized that the Manichaean notions of God were more
problematic than he had originally thought. He realized that the god that the Manicheans claimed
to worship could not be the true God that deserved the worship of human beings. Their god was
“less than absolute,” according to Hick, and “but one of two co-ordinate powers warring against
each other.” Another way of understanding Manicheanism’s concept of god is to envision god as
a “totality.... divided against itself and as including within it the principle and energy of evil.” 24

Ibid.
Burns, Christian Understandings of Evil, 59.
23
Ibid.
24
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 39.
21
22
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To Augustine the Christian, the thought that evil could reside within the Divine 25 and somehow
divide the Absolute was horrific. 26
Evil as Privatio Boni
In order to understand Augustine’s account of privation theory, it is necessary to
understand the Christian commitments that compelled him towards his understanding of evil as
privation. Augustine understands creation to be fundamentally good. 27 Because God is Good,
and created all that exists, all existence shares in the goodness of the Divine. The question then
becomes, for Augustine, from where does evil originate? God cannot be the source of evil, but
evil must come from somewhere. One cannot deny the reality of evil and suffering. It was as
obvious to Augustine as it is to anyone in the contemporary world.
Yet, if God creates everything, and there is evil in the world then, prima facie, God
creates evil. But this cannot be the case for Augustine, because God is Good. Evil must then
come from another source. Therefore, because of his commitments to the Christian belief in the
goodness of created being, Augustine adapted a Neoplatonic concept of the privative nature of
evil. Augustine’s primary influence in this regard was Plotinus, a Roman philosopher who lived
a century prior to Augustine.
Plotinus theorized that all created being came from one ultimate source, a Supreme
One. 28 Because, for Plotinus, this One is good, evil cannot be a part of it, nor can it be a part of
that which emanates from it—i.e., created being. The One creates being in “descending degrees

In order to avoid gendered language to describing God, I will use the terms: God, the Divine, and the Absolute.
These terms should all be understood as synonymous with God.
26
Augustine, Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus, trans. Richard Stothert (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1872), XX 26 in Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 39.
27
Mark Scott, “Rethinking Evil From Ontology to Theology” in Pathways in Theodicy: An Introduction to the
Problem of Evil (Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 2015), 30; John Milbank, “Darkness and Silence,” 15.
28
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 40.
25
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of being and goodness.” 29 This does not mean that those creatures with less goodness and less
being (terms that correlate for Plotinus and Augustine) are more evil. Instead, their degree of
being and goodness corresponds with their role, responsibility, and value within the hierarchy of
being. 30 Using a distance metaphor of sorts, as the creative outpouring of the One begins to move
further from its origin, the creative outpouring begins to lessen (this results in the degrees of
being and goodness); eventually, according to Hick, the creative process “is exhausted and the
vast realm of Being borders upon the empty darkness of non-being,” which Plotinus associates
with evil. 31
Plotinus believed that as the emanation of the One continued away from it, or down from
it, there would eventually be an end to the creative process. Plotinus calls this end, “matter.” 32
Hick explains that Plotinus’ concept of matter is not the same as the scientific notion of matter as
particles that make up the material world. Instead, Plotinus is thinking of matter in the Platonic
sense of “formless and measureless” energy that must be formed into the material world. For
Plato, this matter is given form by the “Ideas,” according to Hick; whereas, Plotinus understands
the emanation of the One to give form to matter. 33
Evil, for Plotinus, is not something that is inherent to human beings. Evil has existed
since the beginning, but as non-being. Hick notes that here there seems to be some confusion in
Plotinus’ thought on evil. On the one had he affirms the non-existence of evil, that it is a
privation of the good; on the other hand, however, he sometimes thinks about evil as something
that seems to have an existence of its own. 34 This difficulty in articulating the metaphysical

Ibid., 41.
Thinking of the world in a hierarchical way was commonplace in the late antiquated and medieval time periods.
31
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 41.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., 42.
29
30
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concept of evil as privation is one that Augustine will also struggle with, but in some sense, this
struggle to articulate is part of metaphysical thinking.
Augustine found in Plotinus a philosophical understanding of evil that seemed to fit well
with certain Christian metaphysical commitments that Augustine had. One such commitment, is
belief in the goodness of God. For Augustine “God is the ultimate of being and goodness.” 35
Because God is the creator of all being, all creation in some way shares in the goodness of the
Divine. Burns explains: “There is nothing contrary to God, because ‘the contrary of existence is
non-existence. There is therefore no nature contrary to God.’” 36 Burns notes that there is
something of a contradiction in Augustine’s line of thought here; for if all existence is
synonymous with God, then how can natures other than God’s exist? For Augustine, created
beings exist because they share in the power of existence and goodness of God, but in a finite
way. 37
Augustine’s second Christian commitment is to the goodness of all created being.
Created being is good because it shares in the goodness of God by virtue of its Divine origin. Not
only is it good, but there is a certain hierarchy of goodness in created being. Augustine would
understand human beings to be at the top of this hierarchy because of their inherent intellect,
with varying degrees of goodness inherent in the rest of created being: human beings have more
value than animals, animals have more value than plants, plants have more value than nonorganic things, and so on. In my own understanding, this second commitment (the inherent
goodness of being) is the foundational assumption for privation theory. If created being is not
inherently good, then the privation account of evil seems to fall flat.

Ibid., 43; Scott, “Rethinking Evil,” 30.
Burns, Christian Understandings of Evil, 61.
37
Scott, “Rethinking Evil,” 30.
35
36
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With these two metaphysical commitments in mind, Augustine comes to the conclusion
that evil cannot be an entity per se. Instead, Augustine conceives of evil as a privation, following
Plotinus. Because God is good, God cannot create evil. Therefore, evil cannot have a positive
existence like the rest of creation; it is instead best understood as a privation. Privation, for
Augustine, means the lack of some good that ought to be present in a particular being. 38 For
instance, it is not an evil for a human being to be unable to breath underwater, as this is not an
attribute of being human. However, if a fish was born unable to breath underwater, this would be
considered by Augustine, and later Aquinas, to be an evil, because the good the fish ought to
have, by virtue of being a fish, is absent. 39
Privation theory seems to give us a plausible account of certain evils easily enough. In the
above example, privation theory seems able to account for the fish born without the ability to
survive underwater, or even a bird born without wings. It also seems as though sickness and
disease can be understood as privative forms of evil. In spite of the fact that contemporary
science shows that most diseases are not caused by an absence of health, but by active agents
within the body (bacteria, viruses, etc.), privation theory is still able to account for sickness and
disease. As Kane notes, the objection (that sickness and disease are caused by active agents) is a
weak one. Just because an evil is caused by an active agent, does not mean that some good is not
deprived from the body—i.e., health. 40
Kane, however, notes a stronger objection to privation theory: “the occurrence of pain in
the body is a departure from the state of good health, and any departure from the normal healthy

Kane, “Evil and Privation,” 43.
A fish being born without the ability to survive under water would be considered a natural evil by Augustine.
Therefore, it is a possibility because of the Fall.
40
Ibid., 48.
38
39
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state of the body is evil. But pain is something more than merely a departure from the state of
normal good health.” 41 In other words, pain is not the absence of health, but is itself a positive
experience. Therefore, pain as a positive experience must be accounted for as both an evil, but
also a good because of its positive existence, at least according to Kane. 42 However, an obvious
weakness of this objection to privation theory is the association of pain with evil. Pain, according
to Bill Anglin and Stewart Goetz, should not necessarily be associated with evil. 43 On my view,
the inherent association between pain and evil is a leap at best. Pain is that which results from
evil; for example, the phantom pain from a limb that has been lost. The pain itself is not
necessarily the evil, the evil is the loss of a limb. 44
However, Augustinian privation theory seems, prima facie, to have some difficultly
accounting for moral evils. Accounting for moral evils in Augustine’s account of privation
theory seems difficult because most moral evils involve some positive action on the part of the
agent. Anglin and Goetz use the example of one person murdering another by stirring poison into
the other person’s drink. How can privation theory account for the seemingly positive evil action
of stirring poison into another’s drink, thereby killing them? They respond: “Just stirring poison
into the coffee is not itself evil. Indeed, an act of murder is something good not insofar as it is an
act of murder but insofar as it is an act of a certain type which may or may not involve a
privation such as the failure to respect life, but which will be done on account of something that
agent believes is good.” 45 It is not the act which makes the killing evil, it is the privation in the

Ibid., 50.
Ibid.
43
Bill Anglin and Stewart Goetz, “Evil Is Privation” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13. no. 1
(1982): 6.
44
One might note that pain can be understood as a case of suffering, and suffering most certainly can be a form of
evil. However, suffering can be understood as a lack. Suffering might be understood as a lack of happiness,
contentment, peace, etc. Therefore, I think it is important to make a distinction between evil and suffering. Not all
forms of evil are suffering, but it seems that all forms of suffering might be considered evil.
45
Ibid., 7.
41
42
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motive of the person committing the action. If killing was itself privative, an evil action, then we
would have to punish every instance of killing—i.e., police violence, killing in war, defending
one’s family, etc.—and many philosophers would argue that there are indeed instances of
justified killing.
Consider a second, more difficult example: torture. There is a qualitative difference
between justified killing and torture. It seems to me that torture is always wrong, and there is
never a good justification for torturing anyone. 46 Todd Calder writes: “the malicious torturer is
not just not as good as she might be. She is not simply withholding gestures of kindness which a
morally decent person would bestow; her actions are positively bad and these actions are
constituted by attributes she possess, i.e., desires for other people’s pain for pleasure, and not by
attributes she lacks.” 47 While Calder makes a strong objection by stating that the desire for
torture does not come from attributes lacked, but from attributes that the torturer has, this does
not necessitate that there is no privation of some good in the torturer. Just because she has a
positive desire which seems to drive her to torture, does not mean that she does not lack some
proper recognition of the good. In fact, her desire to inflict pain for her own pleasure can be seen
as the pursuit of a seemingly good end. Augustine might respond that one’s desires do not
determine the action of the will; the privation in the torturer is a will that has turned “away from
the unchangeable good and toward changeable goods.” 48 Ultimately Augustine explains that
human beings are not slaves to their desires, “for the will cannot be forced into such iniquity by

It is true that many have tried to come up with justifications for torture, but I think many ethicists would agree that
no potential justifications actually succeed.
47
Todd C. Calder, “Is the Privation Theory of Evil Dead?,” American Philosophical Quarterly 44 no. 4 (2007): 373.
48
Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, 68.
46
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anything superior or equal to it, since that would be unjust; or by anything inferior to it, since
that is impossible.” 49
Therefore, it seems that the Augustinian account of privation theory is able to account for
moral evils. However, in accounting for moral evils, privation theory does not question the
morality of the action itself but focuses on the will of the agent. Augustine explains that moral
evil comes from a “perverse will.” 50 Milbank notes that, for Augustine, because of Adam’s sin,
humanity lost its “vision of God” and is faced with physical death and “incapacity of the body.”
Milbank continues: “As a result of this twin impairment, will as desire lacks both vision and
capacity and degenerates into concupiscence.” 51 In other words, our will is turned away from
God and toward changeable goods, which result in evil.
Understanding evil as privation allowed Augustine to both circumvent Manichaean
understandings of the relationship between good and evil, and to hold that God is not responsible
for evil in the world. Next, I examine Aquinas’ understanding of evil as privation. For the most
part, Aquinas will closely follow the Augustinian notion of evil as privation. Yet, he will also
begin to systematize the notion of evil as privation, and he will give more credence to the notion
that evil exists as privation.
Aquinas On Evil as Privation
Thomas Aquinas lived nearly a millennium after Augustine, but nonetheless is potentially
the second most influential theologian and philosopher in Christian history, behind Augustine. In
Ibid., 71. Here there could be a discussion of things like addiction or severe mental illness. In cases of drug and
alcohol addiction the brain chemistry of the addict is changed so that a dependency upon the drug is formed. It is
therefore more difficult to suggest that Augustine’s understanding of the will controlling our actions independently
of other input. However, Augustine did not have the same understanding (or any understanding) of brain chemistry
that contemporary persons have, and there is something to be said for addicts still being able to gain control over
their addiction via their will, although not without support and occasional medical intervention.
50
Ibid., 104.
51
Milbank, “Darkness and Silence,” 18.
49
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his work, De Malo, Aquinas attempts to examine the nature of evil. Brian Davies explains that
Aquinas is not writing about “amazingly wicked deeds;” instead, he is concerned with “‘badness
across the board,’ or ‘the undesirable in general.’” 52 While, for Augustine, God could not be the
source of evil because of the goodness of the Divine, Aquinas believed that God could not be the
source of evil because God is the source of all being. According to Aquinas, as the source of
being God is “‘Being Itself’ or ‘Subsisting Being.’” 53 Since evil is a privation, or lack of
goodness which is associated with being, God cannot be the source of evil as this would imply a
lack of being within God. 54
Although Aquinas agrees with Augustine that evil is a privation, a lack of some good a
particular being ought to have, he further explains evil in more systematic terms. Hick states:
“Following Augustine, he defines evil in general negative terms. But he renders the traditional
definition more precise by giving priority, among the several terms used by Augustine, to
‘deprivation’ and ‘defect.’” 55 Burns notes that Aquinas and Augustine had different
philosophical commitments which informed their notions of evil as privation. Augustine’s
philosophical commitment was to the Neoplatonic philosophy of Plotinus, as I mentioned above.
Aquinas, on the other hand, is committed to Aristotelianism. 56
Aristotle synthesizes the dualistic worldview of the Greeks into one unified reality. While
Plato held that the highest reality was that of the intelligible world, Aristotle conceived of a
reality in which there was no separation between the world of sensory experience and the world
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of the forms. 57 Aristotle believed that thoughts corresponded to reality, and he understood this
correspondence in terms of universals. Burns explicates: “A universal is an idea that represents
that which is common to all members of a particular genus or group of things.” 58 Aquinas strays
from a strict materialist realist view—which states that there is exact correspondence between
the idea of a thing and the thing itself—and instead developed a more moderate understanding of
the realist position in light of his theological beliefs. 59 As Burns notes, “The Thomist position on
universals is that everything in the abstract concept applies to every instance of a thing and the
universality of the concept is a product of the mind.” 60 For Aquinas, universals ultimately derive
from the mind of God. Everything that exists within the world has a corresponding concept that
applies to it. For instance, the concept of man applies to every instance of a true man. More
generally, the concept of person applies to every human being that Aquinas would consider a
person. It is, in fact, the things correspondence to the concept that makes it what it is—i.e., a
person is a person inasmuch as it corresponds with the concept of person.
Because of Aquinas’ Aristotelean commitments, he has a different metaphysical
conception of reality than Augustine. While Augustine believed in the goodness of created being,
a deviation from his Neoplatonic commitments, he was nevertheless influenced by the dualism of
Platonic thought. 61 Platonic dualism suggests that there is a separation between the world of
sensory experience and the world of the forms. This separation between the world of the senses
and the world of the intellect allowed Augustine to say that evil is nonbeing, because there is, for
the Neoplatonist, a continuum of being. The world of the forms, or the intellect, has the most
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being or is the most real. The sensory world has less being, and therefore is less real. This
continuum ends at nonbeing; the point at which Augustine places evil. 62
Aquinas’ realist commitments cause him to have a different understanding of the
privative nature of evil than Augustine. While Augustine strongly maintained that evil does not
strictly exist, Aquinas will deviate from this and say that evil as a privation can have no existence
on its own. 63 However, as a privation of the good, evil does exist. Evil exists insofar as it is
parasitic on the good. Davies explains: “Aquinas holds, evil has no independent existence. It ‘is
there’ only in the sense that something ‘is missing.’” 64 For Aquinas then, evil is in some way a
nonbeing like Augustine imagined, but in its nothingness, it exists parasitically.
Aquinas equates goodness with desirability: “we need to note that good is, properly
speaking, something real insofar as it is desirable, for the Philosopher in the Ethics says those
who said that good is what all things desire defined it best.” 65 Aquinas understands the good to
be what all things desire. He continues on: “But we call what is contrary to good evil. And so
evil is necessarily what is contrary to the desirable as such. And what is contrary to the desirable
as such cannot be an entity.” 66 However, just because evil is not an entity per se, does not mean
that Aquinas denies that evil has some kind of existence—i.e., an existence parasitic on the
good. 67
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Aquinas continues on to note that all creation can ultimately be traced back to God, the
“first and universal cause,” and because God created particular beings, God must have also
created particular goods. Hence, Aquinas insists that evil cannot have being because it is contrary
to good. He writes: “if evil were a real thing, it would neither desire anything nor be desired by
anything, and so have no activity or movement, since nothing acts or moves except because of
the desire of an end.” 68 This understanding of movement or action comes from Aristotle as well.
Aristotle believed that in order to truly understand something, you need to understand what
causes it. For Aristotle, there are four causes: the first is the material cause—i.e., what is the
thing made of and what are its parts? The second cause is the formal cause—what causes this
particular thing to be different from other particular things? The third cause is the efficient cause.
The efficient cause is most important for Aquinas here, as this category is concerned with how
things move from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. Lastly, Aristotle understood all
things to have a final cause. The final cause is the end a particular thing tries to achieve. 69
Evil, for Aquinas, cannot exist like created being because it does not have an efficient or
final cause. Scott explains: “creation naturally strives for its particular form of goodness.
Rational agents direct their actions toward beneficial or salutary ends, real, or perceived. Evil
represents the misdirection of their striving, whereas evil itself has no end or desire in itself, it is
simply negation.” 70 However, while Aquinas understands evil to be primarily privative in nature,
he also understand it to have some kind of existence: an existence parasitic on the good.
Aquinas ties the reality of evil very closely to the existence of the good. He understands
all creation to be good because its source is God. However, he writes about evil as if it inheres
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within the foundations of the goodness of created being itself: “evil is only the privation of a due
perfection, and privation is only a potential being, since we say that things that nature designs to
possess a perfection that they do not have are deprived. Therefore, it follows that there is evil in
good, since we call potential beings good.” 71
However, this does not mean that Aquinas ascribes the same kind of being to evil that he
does to good; it is clear that Aquinas understands evil to be privative in nature. Yet, he connects
it closely with the good because this enables him to say that evil exists as an accidental cause of
the good. By accidental, Aquinas does not mean unintended; instead, accidental denotes a quality
that is nonessential to the nature of a particular being. 72 He says, “the cause of evil is good in the
way in which evil can have a cause. For…evil cannot have an intrinsic cause.” 73 In this way,
Aquinas begins to articulate the parasitic existence of evil. Aquinas is more willing than his
predecessor to ascribe an accidental existence to evil. He writes: “we conclude that every evil has
a cause, but only by accident, since evil cannot have an intrinsic cause.” 74 And ultimately, for
Aquinas, that cause is the good: “in one way, good as deficient causes evil; in the second way,
good as an accidental cause causes evil.” 75
While in some ways Aquinas’ insistence on the parasitic existence of evil seems to run
contrary to privation theory, it can be better understood as a further development of the
Augustinian notion of privation. Aquinas strengthens a seeming area of weakness in Augustine’s
original account of evil. As discussed above, while Augustine’s privation account of evil has
certain strengths when describing malformations, physical lack, health problems, and the like, it
Ibid., 65-66.
For instance, for Aquinas, rationality is an essential quality for a human being to possess by nature of being
human. However, height is an accidental quality. It can vary among human beings and there is no one height that
makes one human. The same could be said for hair color and various aspects of human beings.
73
Ibid., 70.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid., 71.
71
72

Shrader-Perry 22
has a seemingly weaker stance when describing moral evil. Above I showed how Augustinian
privation theory was able to account for moral evil, but it seems to me that the Thomistic account
of evil as privation is better suited to account for moral evil.
Gregory Reichberg captures the critique of Augustine’s account of evil perfectly, “Can
the idea of a falling away from the good, however refined, come anywhere close to capturing the
calculation, the commitment, the energy, and the drive that underlie the most virulent projects in
malfeasance.” 76 Aquinas empowers the privation account of evil in its ability to account for
moral evil by explaining how evil can be thought to exist parasitically on the good. For Aquinas,
according to Reichberg, “A wrongful deed has the character of privation insofar as it lacks a due
ordination to the agent’s rightful end; it is something more than privation insofar as it is an act
posited in opposition to the moral rule.” 77 Reichberg explains that if Aquinas continued with
Augustine’s understanding of evil as nonbeing, then he would be committed to an understanding
of sin which ruled out intentional wrongdoing. Instead, “when sin is classified within the
category of mixed privation…the experience of varying degrees of gravity is readily made
intelligible ‘by reference precisely to that element which is said in a positive manner.’” 78
Reichberg explains that intentional moral evils affect both the action and the agent. The
action is “deprived of its due excellence,” while the agent “is…deprive of valuable internal
goods, natural and supernatural.” 79 Human beings commit evil actions because of “some defect
of the will,” according to Reichberg. 80 Evil, because it is a privation, cannot be the final cause of
anything. The only way that evil can be committed by human beings is when they choose an evil
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that they perceive to be a good. 81 He explains: “nothing exercises causality except insofar as it is
in act; evil, as such, represents the privation of act. Hence, evil qua evil cannot function as a
cause; it is only when annexed to a good that evil is possessed of a corrupting power.” 82 As I
stated above, good is the accidental cause of evil; therefore, for evil to have any existence or
causal power it must be concomitant to some good. Ultimately, Aquinas concedes that it is a
defect on the part of the agents will that cause her to choose evil. 83
Aquinas, following Augustine, maintains that evil is privative in nature; it does not exist
in the world per se. However, Aquinas differs from his predecessor in that he understands evil to
exits parasitically on the good. This in turn, allows Aquinas to develop a more nuanced
understanding of intentional moral evil. Moral evil, according to Aquinas, exits insofar as it is
the accidental consequence of the pursuit of some perceived good. Aquinas explains that it is a
misdirected will that turns the moral agent to evil deeds. However, this does not mean that
human beings commit evil out of ignorance. There is some level at which we will evil actions
knowing that they are evil.
Both Augustine and Aquinas understand evil to be privative in nature. Augustine
maintains that evil is nonbeing, while Aquinas explains that evil can exist parasitically on the
good. This distinction is important when considering moral evils. The Thomistic account
provides contemporary proponents of privation theory a defense against one of the major
critiques brought against them. For many, privation theory seems unsatisfying in its description
of horrendous moral evils. However, on the Thomistic account, evil can be understood as an
absence, yet it can be understood to have some kind of existence precisely because of its
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absence. The Thomistic account allows the privation theorist to say that evil does exist, but not
on its own. As Reichberg explained above, in the Thomistic account our actions can be
understood as privations and as more than privations. Therefore, we can declare horrendous evils
as evil both in the privative sense, and in the sense in which they are more than privations by
their opposition to the moral law.
One of the important presuppositions of privation theory is the inherent goodness of
created being. For Augustine, creation is good because, by virtue of its being created by a
perfectly good God, it shares in the goodness of the Divine. Aquinas understands creation to be
good because God is the ground of being that sustains all existence. Nevertheless, privation
theory cannot account for evil if the presupposition of the goodness of being is not accepted.
Therefore, I turn now to an account of how metaphysical reflection on created being can enable
contemporary persons to rediscover the goodness, or value, of being.
Chapter 2
Metaphysical Reflection and the Value of Being
Desmond articulates an account of the end of metaphysics in terms of the modern
response to what he calls the “equivocity of the ethos.” 84 The ethos for Desmond is the
“ontological context or overdetermined matrix of value” in which human beings find
themselves. 85 In some ways, human beings fear that which they cannot systematize and control,
and the equivocity of the ethos escapes strict systemization. Therefore, instead of having an open
hospitality to the equivocity of being, human beings look at the plurality of being with
hostility. 86 No longer is the goodness of being recognized; instead, the inherent value of being
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becomes equated with the utility of being in its ability to advance humanity’s purposes.
Following Hobbes and Spinoza, Desmond says of the current attitude towards the contemporary
ethos: “we do not love the good; what we love, we call the good.” 87 Ultimately, this attitude
results in a distrust of other-being. 88
Desmond recounts that premodern philosophers not only had an account of the
teleological value of being, but they also had a strong sense of the “archeology of the good.” 89
Premodern philosophers understood that the origin of being was itself good; therefore, being was
good as well. Desmond explains: “this point is more Platonic than Aristotelian: The Good itself
as origin, as original, not just as end.” 90 Desmond understands the mistrust of modernity to be
directed towards this originative good. He accounts for this by suggesting that the removal of
teleological goods from our “rational scheme of intelligibility has a boomerang effect on the
archeology of the good.” 91 Removing the goods towards which being strives has the unintended
effect of obscuring the Good as origin.
Human beings fear that which they cannot control, and the result is a loss of the good and
a homogenizing of being. The homogenizing of being is our attempt to make the world
intelligible, to make it fit into a univocal category that we can systematically understand and
control. However, this results in an understanding of other-being as inherently worthless.
Desmond says, “the truth of the other as object becomes a homogenous valueless being-there; it
becomes a worthless thereness.” 92 The value of being is then only recognized when other-being
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becomes useful for self-being. According to Desmond, this affects the world in two ways. Of the
first, he states: “the objectification drains the world of values, considered as final causes; the
world is purposeless, but we are purposeful, and cannot but be purposeful; the very neutralization
of the world is itself no neutral project but the product of a will to purpose.” 93 Of the second:
“We [human beings] become the source of purpose, we become the purpose in an otherwise
purposeless world.” 94
In devaluing the good, we devalue being. In devaluing being, we make ourselves the
measure of value. We objectify being and make value subjective. In an attempt to make the
world as univocal and intelligible as possible, we actually create a world devoid of meaning. For
Desmond, this devaluing of being takes the form of a quest for autonomy. What Kant envisioned
as a freedom for human beings, actually becomes a freedom from other-beings. Desmond says of
this quest for autonomy: “suppose we say that the law of self, or noms of to auto, is first freedom
from: it cannot be fit into the network of objectivities; it is over against them.” 95 This freedom is
a selfish freedom, one that seeks autonomy for itself, and not for the other. Freedom of this sort
cannot truly be free from other-being because, as Desmond explains, it is constantly reacting to
the reality of other-being. Other-being becomes valuable only inasmuch as it is useful to selfbeing. Instead of understanding other-being as distinctly other, it becomes “other relative to the
self.” 96
This eventually leads Desmond to an understanding of radical autonomy as a form of will
to power. 97 Will to power, as Desmond understands it, is self-defeating. Will to power creates a
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valueless creation, in which only human beings can supply the necessary value to other-being.
However, Desmond aptly notes, that human beings are just as much a part of the valueless world
that they have made. He says, “for we have made the whole of creation worthless; we are also
creatures in creation; as part of the valueless whole, the human is also valueless, ultimately.” 98
This valueless place that modernity has brought us to is not the promised land. However,
Desmond sees in the valueless landscape of modernity a potential for a rebirth, a reclaiming of
metaphysics. Now that we have been brought to the point of utter valuelessness, we can clearly
see that the end result of will to power and radical autonomy is an illusion. Now we are in a
place for a metaphysical rebirth. One in which we can reclaim the value of being as distinctly
other.
For Desmond, we have come to a point of metaphysical renewal in the contemporary
world. Along with this renewed emphasis on metaphysics, comes a renewed understanding of the
goodness and value of being. As I stated above, the goodness of being is one of the
presuppositions of privation theory, and without an understanding of the goodness of being
privation theory will be unable to provide a normative account of evil in the contemporary world.
Desmond’s account ties metaphysics and the value of being together. After Kant and the turn to
the self, philosophers began to abandon conceptions of being that presupposed its goodness.
Instead, they began to understand the human being as the measure and creator of the goodness of
being. However, Desmond provides a way for us to think metaphysically about being and to
rediscover the goodness of creation.
The next chapter surveys two contemporary philosophers whose ideas will help to
develop privation theory into a normative account of evil in the contemporary world. First, I will
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examine Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics. Desmond provides a metaphysical account of
the world that revitalizes the inherent goodness of being. Second, I examine Hannah Arendt’s
account of the banality of evil. I use Arendt so show that it is possible that even the most
horrendous evils can be conceived via a series of mundane everyday evils.
Chapter 3
Contemporary Thinkers on Evil
William Desmond’s Metaxological Metaphysics
Desmond’s metaxological 99 metaphysics is the foundation of all of his philosophical
thought. He attempts to retrieve the wisdom of the ancients, looking to the past to guide
contemporary philosophers in the present. After the enlightenment, there was an attitudinal shift
from desire seeking good “because it is the good” towards “the good is the good because desire
seeks it.” 100
In his metaxological metaphysics, Desmond attempts to reclaim what was lost during the
enlightenment: a fundamental wonder about being. He calls this “agapeic astonishment.” 101 He
writes:
The advent of metaphysical thinking is in a primal astonishment. Astonishment itself is
primal. It is elemental and irreducible. Plato speaks of thaumazein as the pathos of the
philosopher. This is sometimes translated as wonder and this is not inappropriate.
Astonishment, however, captures the sense of being rocked back on one’s heels, as it
were, by the otherness of being in its givenness. 102
It is ultimately this initial astonishment with the givenness of being that leads us into
metaphysical perplexity. This agapeic astonishment comes before metaphysical perplexity, for
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Desmond. It is the initial event that propels us towards metaphysical thinking. Christopher Ben
Simpson says this about metaphysics: “metaphysics…asks the ultimate ‘why’ of being: why
being and not nothing?” 103 This question, the why of being, leads Desmond to an understanding
of the givenness of being. 104
For Desmond, metaphysical thinking happens in a particular context: the between.
Simpson explains: “Desmond understands the ‘meta’ of metaphysics as double, as referring to
how it is to meditate on both the beyond...and the ‘in the midst’ of being as intimately
related...” 105 We think metaphysically from the between; between origin and end, between
beginning of life and death, between self-being and other-being. We think metaphysically from a
particular ethos of being as well. Simpson explains that unlike the previous ethos, one that was
open to the good and the overdeterminate sense of being, the current ethos is one in which
mindfulness has been cut off “from some of the deeper, overdeterminate resources of the primal
ethos.” 106 The current ethos has shifted the primal ethos in two particular ways: by the
objectification of being and the subjectification of value. Both the objectification of being and
the subjectification of value happen together, they are interrelated, yet they can be
distinguished. 107
The objectification of being happens as humans begin to understand the good as
synonymous with their own desires. Instead of recognizing the inherent value in created being,
value becomes equated with that which can provide the most utility to humanity. The good is
that which serves humanity in the most efficient way. As this objectification of being rises, the
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subjectification of value closely follows. Instead of value being realized in other-being, human
beings become the measure of value. For, the good is only good as long as it is good for me. Not
even good to me, but for me. The subjectification of the good follows from the turn to the
subject. Human beings become the determinative aspect of the good in other-being. In the end,
Desmond understands this to result in a human will to power that will culminate in a nihilistic
end. 108 Desmond’s entire project can be categorized as an attempt to turn us away from nihilism
and towards the primal ethos.
The primal ethos is characterized by an understanding of the overdeterminate nature of
being. Simpson explains: “The ethos/between is a prior happening...and givenness that is always
already given and that, as such, contains the promise/potentiality/possibility of the
fulfillment/realization/actualization of beings.” 109 This primal ethos is the ethos of the ancients.
Those who were moved by wonder, astonishment, and perplexity at the fact that anything is at
all.
Why does being exist? Because it was given to be. There is no other reason. The very
ability to ask anything at all about being comes to us from the givenness of being itself.
Desmond explains: “this surfacing of the question is not first generated by some self-sufficient
act of autonomous thought. It comes to us from a depth of otherness, the otherness of being
itself, that we cannot claim to control, or completely encapsulate in our subsequent concepts.” 110
Our connection with being is not a dualistic object/subject relationship; instead, our relationship
to being is “immediate” and intimate. 111 D.C. Schindler writes: “one finds oneself always already

Ibid.
Ibid., 26.
110
William Desmond, Being and the Between, 4.
111
Ibid., 4.
108
109

Shrader-Perry 31
‘in’ being, and one finds being always already ‘in’ one’s thinking.” 112 In coming into an
awareness of one’s own contingent existence, one begins to realize that one’s own existing and
thinking originates outside one’s self; being comes from some other. 113
The question of being itself leads one to an initial astonishment with being. 114 Simpson
explicates: “this initial astonishment at givenness is overdeterminate—an awareness of an
original unarticulated plentitude prior to and exceeding all determinate facts and definitions.” 115
Ultimately, the overdeterminate reason for there being anything at all leads us to an
understanding of being as primarily given to be. According to Desmond, the fact that human
beings find themselves to be at all, and to be in the midst of other-being, leads to the astonishing
conclusion of the givenness of being. 116
Ultimately, Desmond understands all being to be given to be; not only given to be but
given to be for itself. Created being is made as other to the originative source of being. 117 There
is a self-determining to being. Beings exist for themselves, and this is expressed in the selfdetermination of beings to continue their existence. However, while beings are for themselves,
they are not closed off to other-being. 118 This Desmond describes as an open wholeness.

112

D.C Schindler, “The Positivity of Philosophy: William Desmond’s Contribution to Theology,” in William
Desmond and Contemporary Theology, eds. Christopher Ben Simpson and Brendan Thomas Sammon (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2017), 121.
113
In the earlier parts of Desmond’s work, he does not talk about the contingency of being. He writes about the
contingency of being in relation to Aquinas argument from contingency in God and the Between. However, I think
contingency is an appropriate way to talk about coming to the realization that the self does not generate its own
being.
114
Christopher Ben Simpson, Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern, 35.
115
Ibid., 35.
116
Desmond, Being and the Between, 5-6.
117
Ibid., 377.
118
Ibid., 292.

Shrader-Perry 32
Desmond understands being to be ontologically good. He states: in agapeic mindfulness
“the gift of being intimates that it is an agape, and to be rejoiced in for its own sake, for the
intrinsic worthiness of its sheer being there.” 119 He understands all being to have value (to be
good) first, because all being is given to be. Agapeic mindfulness is the recognition of the
inherent goodness of being. This mindfulness has genesis in agapeic astonishment at the
givenness of being. The givenness of being in and of itself is a good because there is no reason
for being other than its givenness. 120 Second, being is good because it is given to be for itself.
The fact that being is at all, and that it is free, is good. 121 Third, being is good because particular
beings are integrities of being. Desmond says: “to be is to be an integrity of being, which is to be
a one.” 122 However, this does not mean that Desmond understands concrete beings as closed off
to other beings. He conceptualizes these integrities as open wholes. 123
Desmond articulates four different ways of being: the univocal, the equivocal, the
dialectic, and the metaxological. Each way of being illuminates a different understanding of
being; none of the ways of being should be abandoned, but in some sense each way of being
progresses towards the next culminating in the metaxological.
The first way, or sense, of being is the univocal. 124 In this understanding of being, the
emphasis is placed on the determinacy of being. Simpson explicates: “all being is seen to be
determinately intelligible.” 125 Simpson explains that while the univocal sense of being is

Ibid., 201.
Ibid., 506.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid., 508.
123
Ibid., 506.
124
This section on the ways of being will primarily come from Christopher Ben Simpson’s book, Religion,
Metaphysics, and the Postmodern: William Desmond and John D. Caputo. I have chosen to draw from this book for
this section because Simpson attempts a systematic articulation of the whole of Desmond’s thought.
125
Simpson, Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern, 29.
119

120

Shrader-Perry 33
accurate in some ways, in many other ways it is lacking. In two primary ways univocity fails to
account for being: the first, univocity cannot account for the “ambiguity of being, and it ignores
what does not fit into its determinate framework.” The second, univocity cannot “account for the
will to univocity—the desire to account for all of being in terms of determinant intelligibility—
itself.” 126
The second sense of being is the equivocal. The equivocal sense of being, in contrast to
the univocal, stresses “manyness over unity, difference over sameness, ambiguity over clarity.”
However, like the univocal sense of being, equivocity cannot account for being in its fullness
either. Ultimately an insistence on the equivocal causes a fall into sheer chaos. Simpson explains:
“remaining with sheer equivocity means not only the dispersal of being but the dissolution of
mindfulness itself. There is no reason the absolute claim of equivocity should stand when all
other absolute claims cannot.” 127
The third sense of being is the dialectic sense. This sense of being stresses both
determination and difference. Dialectic is a means of making even the indeterminate more and
more determinate through a process of self-mediation. Simpson explains: “the dialectical sense
of being, for Desmond, is truthful in that it points to the necessity of thinking through that
ambiguity and instability of the partial truths and of coming to have some intelligible
understanding of being in its becoming and otherness.” 128 In the dialectic way, the focus is not
on static univocity or on indeterminate equivocity, but on a process of self-mediation by which
even the equivocal becomes more and more intelligibly determinate. Simpson notes that in the
end, the dialectic way fails to fully articulate the fullness of being. In dialectical thinking,
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difference is ultimately subsumed into a determinate self-mediation. Dialectical thinking
therefore ignores “otherness—transcendence and infinities within, without, and above—that
resist the dialectical sense’s total reduction to immanent unity and remains sources of persistent
perplexity.” 129
Lastly, we come to the final sense of being: the metaxological. For Desmond,
metaxological thinking is situated between the objective univocal way and the indeterminate
equivocal way. According to Simpson, it “is a discourse of and in the middle.” 130 It seeks a
determinate unity of being that does not reduce otherness to something subsumed into selfmediated thinking like dialectic. Instead, it seeks a unity that recognizes and celebrates
difference, a community. Simpson writes: “unlike the dialectic, the metaxological sees the
difference between the self and the other as being mediated from the side of the other as well as
from the side of the self.” 131 Here Desmond thinks about mediation in a double sense: “this
double mediation entailed in the metaxological sense of being consists of both self-mediation
(thought thinking itself in thinking its other) and inter-mediation (thought thinking its other).” 132
Because Desmond understands freedom to be an integral part of the goodness of being,
there is an open space for evil in his metaxological metaphysics. The doubleness of being “is so
inherently ambiguous as to be always a danger and a hazard.” 133 Freedom provides the ground
for evil. The potential of created being is both the potential for goodness and the potential for
evil. Therefore, Desmond states: “the human being is the most dangerous being.” 134 In human
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beings, the potential for goodness, the state for which they were made, is as likely as the
potential for evil.
Desmond ties evil to equivocity. This is not to say that equivocity is itself evil, but evil is
found in the equivocal way of being. Evil is tied to the same power that brings creation to life.
Desmond explains: “I want to say that this pre-determinate, pre-reflective equivocity of
faith/distrust comes closer to the ambiguous matrix of our presentiment of the good or evil of
being.” 135 Desmond is somewhat Thomistic in this sense. While he does not explicitly state that
evil is a privation of the good, he certainly connects the existence of evil with the good. Like
Aquinas, Desmond seems to understand evil to be parasitic on the good, at least implicitly. For
ultimately, it is the potential for goodness that allows for the possibility of evil.
Desmond’s metaphysics provides us with a way to begin to rebuild our metaphysical
thinking. His understanding of the goodness of being that allows for the possibility of evil will be
important as I continue to develop some of the normative functions that privation theory can
provide. In the next section I turn to Arendt’s understanding of the banality of evil.
Hannah Arendt: On the Banality of Evil
After the Second World War, Arendt went to the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem.
She describes her own work in Eichmann in Jerusalem as a report of the proceedings of the trial,
but this is not an entirely accurate understanding of her goals. Susan Neiman explains: “Arendt’s
claim that her best-known book was just a long piece of reporting was disingenuous, for her
critics were right to sense that she was not merely describing but also defending something.” 136
According to Neiman, Arendt was writing not strictly about Eichmann and the atrocities that he
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committed in the name of the Nazi regime. Instead, the entire world was under indictment.
Eichmann’s case was, for Arendt, paradigmatic of a wider problem. All people recognize evil in
the world, but very few recognize evil for what it is. Arendt therefore attempts to articulate a
phenomenological account of evil as banal. Neiman explains that, for Arendt, Eichmann was not
the monster that the prosecution attempted to portray him as. Instead, Arendt argues that the
context that Eichmann found himself in contributed to the atrocities that he committed. 137
Arendt herself goes to great lengths to explain the normalcy of Eichmann:
Half a dozen psychiatrists had certified him as “normal”—"more normal, at any rate, than
I am after having examined him,”...another had found that his whole psychological
outlook, his attitude toward his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, sisters, and
friends, was “not only normal but most desirable.” 138
Arendt not only saw him as an entirely normal man, but also did not find him to be particularly
conniving or devious: “[Arendt] concluded that Eichmann’s inability to speak coherently in court
was connected with his incapacity to think, or to think from another person’s point of view.” 139
Throughout the trial Arendt did not see a monster sitting in the glass booth that separated the
accused from the other people in the room; she saw a normal man.
During the trial she realized something about the nature of evil: evil is not necessarily
radical in nature, often times it reveals itself in the subtlest of ways and grows throughout one’s
life. Richard Bernstein explains that Arendt never intended her account of the banality of evil to
be understood as a kind of universal theory to account for all kinds of theoretical evils. Instead,
she understood her account of evil primarily in phenomenological terms. She says, “when I
speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level, pointing to a phenomenon
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which stared me in the face at the trial.” 140 However, the possibility of horrendous evil being
born out of banal evils will become important in showing how privation theory can provide a
normative account of evil in the contemporary world.
Arendt understands evil to be mundane. Not that the total effects of evil are banal or
mundane, but the actions that lead people to atrocious evils are often subtle and unsuspecting. In
the trial, Arendt notes that Eichmann could only be as guilty as his situation would allow.
Eichmann, to his own knowledge and conscience, was a law abiding German citizen. In fact, if
Eichmann had not followed his orders and acted differently than he did throughout World War
II, he would have been a criminal in the German state. Arendt writes about the prosecution’s
argument: “their case rested on the assumption that the defendant, like all ‘normal persons,’ must
have been aware of the criminal nature of his acts.” 141 However, this was not necessarily the case
with Eichmann, or many of the other German commanders during the Second World War. She
even says of Eichmann’s motives: “except for an ordinary diligence in looking out for his
personal advancement, he had no motives at all.” 142 According to Eichmann himself, he did not
even hate the Jewish people. The defense’s testimony states: “He ‘personally’ never had
anything whatever against Jews; on the contrary, he had plenty of ‘private reasons’ for not being
a Jew hater.” 143
In the end, it seemed to Arendt, that Eichmann was not a monster who set out with
radically evil intentions to destroy anyone. He was a law-abiding citizen, who, because of his
drive for advancement followed his orders. This of course for Arendt does not excuse his crimes,
but it does make them more understandable. Her work humanized Eichmann, but it also reveals
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something about the reality of evil itself. Her interpretation of the phenomena that led Eichmann
to his place of imprisonment, brought Arendt to a realization about the nature of evil. During the
trail, she came to the conclusion that evil can be radically subtle in nature, banal.
In Eichmann’s case, like many cases in society, there was no moment that turned him
from a course of good toward unimaginable evil. Instead, his horrendous actions during the war
were the result of a multitude of minute evil choices, some of which he had no control over—i.e.,
the context in which he lived. However, the result was the same. The man standing before the
court, who was obviously not a monster, had committed monstrous acts in the name of the Nazi
regime. In the end, the downfall of Eichmann was his detachment from the wider reality around
him and his “thoughtlessness,” which wreaked “more havoc than all the veil instincts taken
together which, perhaps are inherent in man.” 144
Of the trial as a whole, Arendt said:
If we are to apply this whole reasoning to the Eichmann case in a meaningful way, we are
forced to conclude that Eichmann acted fully within the framework of the kind of
judgement required of him: he acted in accordance with the rule, examined the order
issued to him for its “manifest” legality, namely regularity; he did not have to fall back
upon his “conscience,” since he was not one of those who were unfamiliar with the laws
of his country. 145
Her final conclusion was that Eichmann was a normal man, who through a series of
circumstances, made choices that brought him to the point of being a part of one of the largest
genocides the world had ever seen.
Because of Arendt’s conclusion that evil can be the result of the mundane everyday
choices of human beings, she received much criticism from her contemporaries and even still
today. One of the interesting critiques of her understanding of the banality of evil was that it
144
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seemed too similar to the Augustinian notion of evil as privation. 146 Many of her contemporaries
made the claim that privation theory fails to capture the kind of monstrous evil that must exist for
an event like the Holocaust to take place. While there is some seeming validity to this claim
(although I will ultimately argue that this claim is false), I think a more apt understanding of the
veracity with which Arendt’s contemporaries attacked her is that if her understanding of evil is
accepted, every human being is capable of what Eichmann and the other Nazis did to the Jewish
people.
When faced with horrendous evil, such as the evil of the Holocaust, human beings do not
want to see the humanity of those who commit such horrendous evils. What they would like to
see is a group of people so corrupt and evil that they are no longer recognizable as human beings.
However, if Arendt’s reflections on evil are accepted no one can look at another human being,
even if they have committed horrendous evils, without recognizing the potential for evil in
themselves. Therefore, Arendt’s reflections not only force us to recognize that we all have the
potential for great evil, but that even those who commit great evil are not necessarily monsters
but human beings.
Ultimately, Arendt’s reflections on the banality of evil force people to realize that we all
have the potential for great evil. But her understanding of evil also empowers us to fight against
growing evil in human beings. Neiman explains: “the claim that evil is banal is a claim not about
magnitude but about proportion: if crimes that great can result from causes that small, there may
be hope for overcoming them.” 147 If evil results from mundane causes then we can find ways to
mitigate it. If evil results from monstrous causes, then evil becomes more difficult to overcome.
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Arendt’s reflections on evil are important because they show that horrendous evils need
not be caused by equally horrendous circumstances. Her phenomenological account of
Eichmann’s actions shows that it is possible that some of the greatest evils of the 20th century,
can result from mundane moral evils. As I hope to show in the next section, if banal evils can
lead to monstrous ones, then privation theory is better able to account for events like the
Holocaust. If privation theory can account for moral evils, like the banal kind that Arendt
proposes, and if these banal evils can produce monstrous evils, then privation theory seems to be
able to account for the horrendous evils.
Chapter 4
A Normative Framework
The fundamental principle of privation theory is that evil is the absence of some good
that a particular being ought to have. Privation theory describes moral evil primarily as the result
of the pursuit of lesser goods. As moral agents, we turn our will from unchangeable goods (for
Augustine and Aquinas this means God) towards changeable goods. 148 Even the turning of the
will can be understood as a privation. A perfect will is oriented towards those unchangeable
goods, whereas a privative will is oriented towards the changeable goods of the world. Above I
used the example of the person who tortures others. The torturer’s will is turned towards the
fulfillment of their own desire (in this case the infliction of pain on others for personal pleasure).
Additionally, there is a privation of the respect of life in the torturer. On the Thomistic account,
the torturer’s actions can themselves be understood as privative in that they do not abide by the
moral law.

Maybe unchangeable goods are different for contemporary persons. As a Christian, I’m inclined to accept that
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Can privation theory account for banal evils, like telling a small lie? A lie can be
understood as a privation. First, the liar’s will can be seen as privative in that it is turned towards
the fulfillment of certain desires to avoid punishment (if that is the reason for the lie). The lie
itself can be understood as a privation because it is outside the moral law. There is also a
privation within the liar. Namely, the loss of the moral good that accompanies truth telling.
It seems that privation theory can function as a normative framework to account for evil
in the contemporary world. It can provide contemporary people with an understanding of what
evil is, not just that evil exists. It also exercises compelling explanatory power when describing
evils. As a normative account of evil, it certainly seems to succeed. One might object by saying
that at times it seems unsatisfying, but this objection does not deny its ability to define and
explain moral evil.
One of the benefits of this normative account of evil is that by providing contemporary
persons with an understanding of the nature of evil, they can come closer to developing ways to
mitigate evil in the world. In the contemporary world, evil is often left undefined and
nebulous. 149 Cadler notes that there is a sense in which evil refers to “anything bad or wrong,”
but it can also be understood to refer to “the most despicable sorts of acts, characters, and
events.” 150 Privation theory not only captures both of these meanings, but it gives more content
to them. Evil is not just badness or horrendous actions, it is the absence of some good that a
particular being out to have.
Privation theory presupposes both that being is inherently good, and that there is a
hierarchy to being. According to this hierarchy, certain beings have more goodness than others.
God is the highest being on the hierarchy as Being itself or Pure Act. Human beings are below
149
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God, sharing in God’s goodness and being in a finite way. Below humans are animals followed
by organic (non-animal) beings. 151 As this hierarchy continues down from God, beings have less
and less goodness. Therefore, according to this hierarchy beings have different degrees of
goodness and value—i.e., human beings have a greater degree of goodness than animals, and
animals have a greater degree of goodness than organic (non-animal) beings, etc. The
presupposition that grounds the hierarchy of being is the inherent goodness of all being. Because
all being is created by God, all being shares in God’s goodness. However, according to this
hierarchy, not all being has the same value.
How can we recognize the value of being in a world that has seemingly devalued
being? 152 Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics provides contemporary persons with a new way
to think metaphysically about the contemporary world. His metaphysics attempts to articulate a
system that does not force difference to assimilate with sameness but respects the other as other.
By respecting other-being as distinctly other, one is better able to recognize the value of otherbeing for the sake of other-being. Desmond’s metaphysical vision of the world returns us to a
state of agapeic astonishment. It is here that we are able to recognize the inherent goodness and
value of being.
Privation theory assumes that all being is inherently good. In fact, this is one of the
reasons that Augustine was so adamant about the idea of evil as privation. God, according to
Augustine, is good and creation shares in God’s goodness, and therefore is good as well.
Augustine, in an attempt to protect God’s nature and the nature of creation from accusations of
Animals are distinguished from human beings because of the difference in their rational faculties. This obviously
causes problems for ideas of personhood for those with cognitive disabilities. I recognize that this causes a problem,
but that is beyond the scope of this paper. For a modern version of the hierarchy of being, see Desmond, Being and
the Between, 377-378.
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inherent evil, provides a Christianized version of privation theory. If we accept privation theory
as a normative account of evil in the contemporary world, then we must also accept its
presuppositions.
If contemporary persons accept privation theory as a normative account of evil, we would
need to reevaluate the way in which we attempt to mitigate evil in the contemporary world.
Because privation theory forces us to recognize that no person is inherently evil, we must
recognize the good in all people even when they commit horrendous evils. This, on my view, has
practical implications for our justice system. As it is now, our justice system is an attempt
remove those who have committed evil actions from society. As opposed to rehabilitation, the
justice system focuses on making those who have committed moral evil pay for their actions.
However, if we viewed evil through the lens of privation theory, we would need to be committed
to a form of justice that is focused on rehabilitation. If evil is lack of particular goods in moral
agents—i.e., defects of the will, lack of concern for human life, etc.—then our attempts at justice
should focus on rehabilitating these defects, not just removing people from society. 153
I have already discussed how privation theory can account for some instances of evil.
Above I gave an account of how privation theory can account for sickness, murder, pain, and
torture. Sickness is a particularly interesting case because often sickness is caused by some
active agent (agent here is not a human moral agent, but a being like bacteria or tumors).
However, just because another being, which we would consider to be good by virtue of its
existence, causes sickness, does not mean that there is not some privation of the host. In the case
of sickness, the host who is affected loses health.

Here is one point at which I diverge in my application of privation theory from Augustine and Aquinas, both of
whom argued for capital punishment.
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Does the value of bacteria or a tumor mean that they are deserving of protection
over/against the moral agent? According to privation theory, no. There is a hierarchy of being
that places human agents above organic (non-animal) beings, and therefore justifies human value
over/against the value of organic beings. Therefore, because organic entities like bacteria or
tumors cause privations on the part of human moral agents, humans are justified in eliminating
them.
Another example might be: in the contemporary world, politicians have spent more time
demonizing the other side, as opposed to uniting to maximize the total good of humanity.
However, even this demonizing of the other side can be evaluated differently when we
understand it through the lens of privation theory. 154 In our current political situation, it is
important to remember that human beings at their core are good, not evil. Even though our will is
often turned from actual goods towards perceived goods that often result in evil. If contemporary
people adopt privation theory as the normative lens by which they evaluate evil, then we would
be forced to recognize the goodness of those who hold politically differing views.
One important critique of privation theory is that it does not seem to be able to account
for instances of horrific evil, such as the Holocaust. Some have suggested that privation theory
provides an unsatisfying account of gratuitous evils like genocide. Some others have suggested
that privation theory diminishes the evil of the Holocaust, because evil according to privation
theory does not exist per se. According to these critics, evils that result from the pursuit of lesser
goods seem unable to explain the atrocities committed by the Nazis and downplay the suffering
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right side, so that our nation can be better. However, this good that they seek is in fact an evil that is perceived as a
good.
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of those who experienced them. However, I do not think that this is necessarily true; privation
theory can account for such atrocities.
I think it is important to note that privation theory does not deny the reality of the evils of
the Holocaust. Instead, privation theory insists only that evil does not exist per se, but evil
certainly can exist parasitically upon the good. We might then ask: what good could have caused
the Holocaust? Again, it is important to remember that while, for Aquinas, good is the accidental
cause of evil, it is not the formal or efficient cause. This means that evil is the result of a
perceived good that is sought after, which in reality is not a good worthy of pursuit. 155 Here we
might use Eichmann as an example again. Eichmann did not set out to destroy the Jewish people.
He intended to rise through the ranks of the Nazis regime for his own benefit. Again, this does
not excuse his behavior, but it does put his motivations and actions into a different light. If we
accept Arendt’s phenomenological analysis of evil, it is possible to say that atrocious evils can be
the result of a series of smaller privations. I believe that I have shown that privation theory can
account for banal evils.
One might object: Hitler’s hatred of the Jewish people does not seem to be a privation.
His hatred was a positive feeling—i.e., something he experienced—that motivated him to create
the Nazi empire. The privation theorist might respond: hatred should not itself be seen as an evil.
It seems as though there are certain things that people should hate: injustice, poverty, starvation,
suffering, instances of evil, etc. As such, if hatred is directed at these concepts, it can be a
positive motivating force to mitigate injustices and evil. However, it seems that one could say
Obviously, we are unable to ascertain the true motivations of Hitler, but I think it is fair to assume that he did not
understand his own goals and motivations as evil. Even if we look again at the person who enjoys the torture of
others, we see that in some sense that do not necessarily seek an evil, which would be torture. Instead, they seek a
good, in this case the pleasure that receive from torture. Often times it is difficult to face the idea that even the most
seemingly evil among us are at their core human beings seeking some good, because this means that all of us are
capable of great evil. The fact that all of us are capable of great evil also means that it becomes more difficult for us
to alienate those who commit radically evil acts.
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that hatred directed towards people can be understood as privative. Hatred in this sense has lost
its proper object. Therefore, Hitler’s hatred of the Jewish people can indeed be understood as
privative. If one man’s hatred can be the cause of such a horrendous evil, then it seems as though
privation theory can account for the evils of the Holocaust. Therefore, it seems that privation
theory can account for the existence of banal evils and horrendous evils.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to revitalize the metaphysical account of privation theory
for the contemporary era. I suggest that privation theory can function as a normative account of
evil in the contemporary world. In the first chapter, I began by examining Augustine and
Aquinas, two of the most important philosophers/theologians who developed privation theory in
Christian theology. Both understand evil to have no existence on its own, but Aquinas differs
from Augustine in his understanding of the parasitic existence of evil.
In the second chapter, I gave an account of the connection between metaphysical thinking
and recognizing the good of being. Metaphysical consideration is important when discussing evil
as privation because privation theory has certain metaphysical assumption, such as: the goodness
of being, hierarchies of being, —i.e., there are certain goods that are appropriate for some beings
to have but not others—and the origin of being and its nature.
The third chapter is an examination of some contemporary philosophers on evil. I began
by examining Desmond’s metaphysics as a way to begin to rebuild our metaphysical thinking in
the contemporary era. His four ways of understanding being provide a foundation for
metaphysical thinking in the contemporary era. Then I gave a brief explanation of Arendt’s
thoughts in Eichmann on Jerusalem, especially focusing on her reflections on Eichmann’s

Shrader-Perry 47
humanity and his subtle movement towards the horrendous evils he committed during the
Second World War.
In the fourth chapter, I attempted to show how privation theory can account for evil as a
normative framework for the contemporary world. First, privation theory actually points us
towards the good, because evil can only exist parasitically on the good. Second, I attempted to
articulate a few examples of the normative function of privation theory; showing that it can
account for both mundane evils and horrendous evils.
As a normative lens by which contemporary persons can evaluate evil, privation theory
allows us to give an account of what evil is. Ultimately, evil is a lack of the good. It is important
to have a metaphysical account of evil because knowing what evil is can help people to mitigate
it. To use an example from above: if evil has substance, existence, and people can be evil, then
the current justice system by which we remove evil people from society is an appropriate way to
reduce evil in the world. However, if evil is no-thing (except potentially parasitic on the good),
then we have to reformulate our justice system to focus not on retribution and removing evil
people from society, but on rehabilitation. A justice system based on privation theory would be
forced to recognize the good that is inherent in all people, and it would function to rehabilitate
and maximize the good, thereby reducing evil. 156
It seems as though privation theory can function as a normative lens through which
contemporary persons can understand evil. I hope to have shown throughout this paper that
privation theory can account for evil in the contemporary world. I also hope that I have been able
to articulate some reasons why contemporary persons should adopt privation theory as a

I think there is also a sense in which evil will never be completely eliminated until the fullness of the Kingdom of
God is revealed, but that does not mean that there is not a real possibility of reducing instances of evil, or maybe
better said the effects of evil, in the world.
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normative framework by which we can evaluate and describe evil. I think that if we adopt
privation theory as a normative lens to evaluate evil, we are better prepared to mitigate evil in the
contemporary world.
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